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Extortion and Abuse of Power in the Dutch Republic:
The Case of Bailiff Lodewijk van Alteren
Pieter Wagenaar
Department of Governance Studies, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Administrative systems sometimes need to answer to two normative frameworks, which are
mutually incommensurable. Historians give accounts of what happened when one set of values
was replaced with another, usually during blatant scandals. What went on in everyday life,
when people simply worked with their conflicting systems, is much less obvious. In the case
study below, we try to answer that question by looking at a case of “normal” corruption.
Keywords: corruption, polynormativism, scandal, administrative values
Administrative systems sometimes suffer from what Riggs
calls “polynormativism”: the need to answer to two nor-
mative frameworks, which are mutually incommensurable.
Whereas in modern (for instance post-colonial) societies
the result might be “formalism,” one system hides behind
another (Riggs, 1964), early modern societies sought to bal-
ance their two normative frameworks; Von Thiessen calls
this “Parallelität von Normen” (2009, 94–98). Balancing val-
ues was not the only option early modern administrators
had, though. Norms could also support one another, clash, or
operate in their own closely circumscribed realms or levels
(Schreurs, 2003, 37–39).
Historians sometimes give accounts of what happened
when one set of values was replaced with another, usu-
ally during blatant scandals. What went on in everyday life,
when people simply worked with their conflicting systems,
is much less obvious. In the case study below, we try to
answer that question by looking at a case of “normal” cor-
ruption to try and find out how administrators dealt with their
two sets of norms at moments when no great changes in
value frameworks were occurring, and where the limits to
administrative behavior were.
What were the value systems early modern Dutch admin-
istrators had to deal with? As we have written before
(Wagenaar, 2006), early modern bureaucracies exhibited
traits of what Weber would later call the ideal typical
bureaucracy, but contained many “patrimonial” elements
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as well (e.g., McFarlane, 1996, 50–57; Robertson Prest,
1991, 67–95; Rubinstein, 1983, 55–86; Waquet, 1992:
Introduction). They existed in so-called “face-to-face soci-
eties.” Lacking central population registrations, large state
bureaucracies, police files, social security, insurance compa-
nies, and so on, the members of these societies compensated
by simply knowing anyone they had to do business with,
and knowing his or her family. One’s credit depended on
one’s reputation, and losing reputation could mean losing
one’s livelihood. As penal law reflected the face-to-face
character of society, punishments were often executed pub-
licly with the goal of purposively disgracing their victims.
Being declared infamous in itself was used as a punishment,
and it was a severe one. Of course, face-to-face society’s
highly personal and “particularistic” norms could easily
come into conflict with the impersonal and “universalistic”
norms attached to the budding bureaucracy of early modern
society (Van de Pol, 1992, 179–181, 184).
What were the options open to early modern bureaucrats
when confronted with such conflicting value orientations?
Schreurs (2003, 37–39) has conducted research into the
question of how conflicting values and conflicting value ori-
entations are handled in public administration theory. She
finds that the available literature provides a number of solu-
tions. Administrative theorists discuss the balancing, putting
in hierarchies, reconciliation, and melding of value orien-
tations. They also write of value competition and value
conflicts. If we want to research how administrators han-
dle such conflicts in practice, then Price’s work can serve
as a model. In a study on Ghanaian bureaucracy, Price
combines Fred Riggs’ notion of “polynormativism” (part
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732 WAGENAAR
of Riggs’ famous “prismatic model”) with social role the-
ory. Ghanaian bureaucrats, working in imported government
structures, are confronted with their society’s “traditional”
values and norms on the one hand, and with their offices’
“modern” norms on the other, which coexist but do not
blend. Price’s central thesis is “that the Ghanaian social sys-
tem and culture are essentially hostile to the role behavior
formally required by the civil service bureaucracy because
the culture is dominated by role orientations and expecta-
tions that are not modern” (Price, 1975, 52). To find out
how bureaucratic behavior and traditional role orientations
interact, he has questioned not only civil servants, but also
their clientele. What he finds is that Ghanaian bureaucrats
are forced to abandon the “modern” norms that they have
been taught in favor of “traditional” ones (Price, 1975).
What Price’s Ghanaian administrators do is what
Goodsell calls “extremism,” completely rejecting one value
orientation in favor of another (Goodsell, 1989, 580). Price’s
administrators worked in what Riggs would have called
an “exoprismatic” administration, by which he meant that
“modern” norms and structures had been imposed, from the
outside, on a society to which they were alien.
Early modern European administrators worked in what
Riggs would have called an “endoprismatic” administration.
That they could have been extremist is highly unlikely, as
theirs was not a case of clashes of sets of values and norms
arising out of transplanting western administrative struc-
tures to non-western societies, but of tensions arising out
of new norms and values slowly materializing in a society
still pervaded with older ones. But if “extremism” can hardly
have been an option, how did early modern administrators
manage? Did they try to balance or meld their values and
value orientations? Were they constantly involved in value
conflicts? Our findings will, in all probability, differ from
Price’s, and our research methods must as well. In our case,
holding a survey is not possible. If we want to answer the
question how exactly early modern administrators dealt with
different value orientations, thick description of a single case
seems the only viable research strategy.
BAILIFF LODEWIJK VAN ALTEREN VAN
JAARSVELD: THE MAN, HIS OFFICE, AND HIS
TRIAL
Lodewijk van Alteren (1608–1657) was the son of a politi-
cian from Zeeland, and son-in-law to Amsterdam burgo-
master Anthony Oetgens van Waveren (Elias, 1903–1905,
332, 432–3). The reason he was appointed bailiff
of Kennemerland in 16401 was probably because his
1The ensuing part of this article is based on the following archival
sources: National Archives, records Provincial Court, Inv. nr. 5255.7, 1657,
Stukken rakende Lodewijk van Alteren heer van Jaarsveld, gesuspendeerd
baljuw van Kennemerland; Inv. nr. 5257.31, 1657, Stukken inzake Lodewijk
father-in-law had fallen into disgrace. Van Waveren had
been part of a conspiracy against a rival faction in the
Amsterdam city government—on behalf of stadtholder
Fredrick Henry—but had lost, and had to step down from
office for ten years. To compensate Van Waveren for his loss,
the stadtholder probably helped obtain a lucrative function
for his son-in-law (Elias, 1923, 109–112; Meulenbroek &
Witkam, 1981, 327; Worp, 1914, 24).
The function Van Alteren had thus obtained, being bailiff
of Kennemerland, made him public prosecutor of a rural
district in the north of Holland. He administered high juris-
diction (criminal law cases carrying heavy fines and/or
corporal punishment), whereas the villages under his juris-
diction themselves exercised low jurisdiction (civil law cases
and low fines), and were administered by their village gov-
ernments. Van Alteren’s court met in the town hall of
Haarlem (Zoodsma, 1995, 5) and consisted of seven judges,
a secretary, a messenger, an usher, and a lieutenant-bailiff.
Since 1648, the judges were chosen yearly from candidates
proposed by the bailiff and judges. Each year, half of the
judges were replaced (Wagenaar, 1750, 214–216). If there
weren’t enough judges present when the court convened,
they had to be substituted by men who had been recently
nominated, but had not been elected judges (Lams, 1664,
117–121). The bailiff himself was under the authority of the
provincial court of Holland.
Van Alteren’s court had jurisdiction over the villages
of Groet, Heiloo and Oosdom, Limmen, Akersloot and
De Woude, Uitgeest and Marken-Binnen, Heemskerk,
Castricum, Wormer and East-Knollendam, Jisp, Oostzaan
and East-Zaandam, Bennebroek, Berkenrode, Zuid-
Schalkwijk and Vijfhuizen, Nieuwerkerk, Heemstede,
Schooter-Vlieland, Schooterbosch with Hoogerwoerd and
Zaanen, Spaarndam; Sloten with Sloterdijk, and Osdorp
and de Geer and Houtrijk, Polanen and Raasdorp, Rietwijk
and Rietwijkeroord, and Aalsmeer (Egmond, 1987, 144;
Scholtens, 1947, 73; Wagenaar, 1750). Relations between
these villages, and the bailiwick they were in, were some-
times less than cordial. Bailiffs constantly tried to encroach
on the jurisdiction of the villages, against which the villages
then vehemently protested (Mens, 1946). According to
Willem Gerritsz. Lams, burgomaster of Wormer, none of his
predecessors had been worse in this respect than Lodewijk
van Alteren. To guard against such abuses in the future,
Lams published a thick book on the rights and privileges of
van Alteren, heer van Jaarsveld, baljuw van Kennemerland, wegens een
menigte knevelarijen en mesusen, ontucht en overspel enz.; Haarlem
Record Office, records Consistory Haarlem, Inv. nr. 23, 1648–1659; and on
the printed resolution of the Estates of Holland: Staten van Holland (1657).
Resolutien van de Heeren Staaten van Holland en Westvriesland in haar
Edele Groot Mog. Vergadering genoomen in den jaare 1657. The Hague:
Staten van Holland and Staten van Holland (1658), and Resolutien van de
Heeren Staaten van Holland en Westvriesland in haar Edele Groot Mog.
Vergadering genoomen in den jaare 1658. The Hague: Staten van Holland,
unless literature is cited in the text.
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Kennemerland in 1664, and on the intrusions bailiffs had
made on these in the past (Lams, 1664).
Whether it was these constant intrusions on the author-
ity of the village governments or some other complaint that
started the inquisitions in the Van Alteren case is unclear.
What is clear is the fact that Holland’s provincial court sus-
pended Van Alteren, but then found it very difficult to deal
with him. Van Alteren was tried according to the “extraor-
dinary procedure,” which was usual in criminal law cases.
Although he was evidently guilty, he could not be brought to
confess, not even when confronted with witnesses. Applying
torture to make him confess was something the provincial
court shied away from in the case of a patrician like Van
Alteren, which meant it had to grant him an “ordinary” trial.
Yet, doing such meant that it would become much easier for
Van Alteren to defend himself. He would even acquire the
right to appeal. While his lawsuit was pending, his office
was being fulfilled by a substitute, which was also undesir-
able. As Van Alteren died during his trial, these matters were
never brought to a conclusion. It was the appointment of a
new bailiff in 1658 that put everything to rest.
TWELVE CATEGORIES OF CRIMES
When the provincial court’s public prosecutor was prepar-
ing his case against Van Alteren, he grouped the bailiff’s
misdoings—exactly the kind bailiffs were often accused of
(Dekker, 1986; Egmond, 2001; Hoenderboom, forthcoming;
Van den Bergh, 1857; Wagenaar, 2003; Wagenaar, 2008;
Wagenaar & Van der Meij, 2005, 2006) —under 12 head-
ers. Using the differences between impersonal, “Weberian”
and face-to-face norms, we can make our own division into
four categories. Having to deal with two value frameworks,
there were four kinds of transgressions Van Alteren could
make: he could sin against “Weberian” norms but not against
face-to-face norms; he could sin against face-to-face norms
but not against “Weberian” ones; he could sin against both
sets; and he could get into trouble because he tried to find a
compromise between two conflicting value systems. Sinning
against face-to-face norms only seems not to have happened
in the Van Alteren case, but violating “Weberian” norms was
common.
VIOLATING “WEBERIAN” NORMS
Seventeenth-century Holland was religiously heteroge-
neous. This meant that many people had relatives adhering
to a different faith and that marriages could be religiously
mixed (Pollmann, 2002, 2006). In daily life, people dealt
with the situation through a system of “ecumenicism of
everyday relations” to keep the social peace (Frijhoff, 2002;
39–65). Yet, although the Dutch Republic knew freedom of
conscience, there was no freedom of worship. Many laws,
issued between the 1580s and the 1680s, banned Roman
Catholicism (Po-chia Hsia, 2002, 1–7). Actually enforcing
these laws was a different matter, though, as the majority of
the population was Catholic in many parts of the country,
and strict adherence to the law would also have been bad for
the economy (Van Nierop, 2002, 102–111). Calvinist exclu-
sivism prevented rapid growth of the public church as well
(Duke, 1990, 269–293). Therefore, Catholicism managed to
survive in Holland and, notwithstanding the many laws that
had been issued, there were some 500 priests active in the
Dutch Republic in 1650. About a third of the population
had remained Catholic, making use of clandestine churches
that existed everywhere in the county (Van Eck, 1993–1994,
217–234).
The Westphalian Peace Treaty (1648), which put an end
to both the Thirty Years War and to the second phase of
the Dutch Revolt, posed a threat to this religious status quo.
Calvinist ministers expressed worries that the reason behind
intolerance of Catholics would disappear, as many people
would no longer regard them as a fifth column and gov-
ernment might grant them all kinds of liberties. In fact,
Catholics were growing ever more self-assured in many
places at this time. The clergymen’s protests had a degree of
success: after the peace treaty was concluded, a short period
of lesser tolerance followed with governments actually exe-
cuting the many harsh laws against Catholic practice but, in
the long run, it was tolerance that prevailed (Broeyer, 1998,
47–52, 55, 57–8; Knuttel, 1892–1894, 250–261, 267, 276–
9). Eventually, in the 18th century, government even started
“admitting” priests to their office, which gained them a kind
of recognition, and the Catholic Church became acknowl-
edged as a legal body (Clemens, 1998, 70–77; Van de Sande,
1989, 85–106;).
In the 1650s, some 65–75 percent of the population was
Catholic in the North-Holland countryside (Knippenberg,
1992, 23–24) and Kennemerland seems to have been no
exception. According to a report to the Pope from 1656,
there were 27 secular and 6 regular Catholic clergymen
active in the bailiwick. Nineteen villages had their own
priest. Many members of local government in these vil-
lages were Catholics as well. Unsurprisingly, the Catholics
were quite self-assured in Holland’s north. The population
did not even shy away from beating up policemen, if these
dared disturb Catholic services (De la Torre, 1883, 414–443;
Van Gelder, 1972, 188–120).2 Small wonder, then, that the
ministers of the classis Haarlem filed an official protest
against Catholic impertinence in 1635. Yet, when the provin-
cial court ordered an inspection in 1643, it turned out that
Catholics in Kennemerland simply bribed bailiff Van Alteren
to prevent execution of the law (Thiers, 2005, 22–23), as
was common in the rest of Holland at the time (Kooi, 1999,
112–117).
2I thank Bouke Slofstra for his help with this section.
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That Van Alteren’s dealings with Roman Catholics were
actually brought to court, and that we therefore have detailed
knowledge of what went on, makes his a bit of a cause
célèbre in Dutch historiography. Van Alteren made between
3,800 and 4,000 guilders a year (600 to 800 guilders more
than his predecessor) from extorting Catholics, it turned out
during his trial. He apportioned this sum over the villages
in his bailiwick and made these pay every three months
(Rogier, 1964, 388). The villages affected were: Uitgeest,
Wormer, ’t Kalf, Akersloot, Limmen, Heilo, Castricum,
Heemskerk, Osdorp, Sloten, Jisp, and Aalsmeer. When
parishes welcomed a new priest, Van Alteren expected to
be paid as well. The same went for allowing churches to
be opened after they had been closed by the provincial
court. Van Alteren permitted the Catholics to simply make
a new entrance, thus leaving the provincial court’s seals
undamaged.
Initially, the Catholics had protested against Van
Alteren’s exorbitant financial demands, but he had not given
in and had brought Catholic service to a complete stand-
still in Kennemerland for two years. After that, the Catholics
decided to pay and Van Alteren made them pay for the two
years they hadn’t been able to have services as well. Later,
Van Alteren would hold the parish priest of the village of
Akersloot, Nicolaas Stenius, hostage to extort money, and
would try to do the same to the priest of Castricum. The
financial demands he made on the Catholic community were
so high that the inhabitants of the village of Wormer claimed
they could not support their poor anymore because of it. The
Catholics of the village of Heilo decided to go to church in
the town of Alkmaar, as they couldn’t afford to pay the sums
Van Alteren demanded.
In exchange for being paid, Van Alteren warned Catholics
beforehand when a raid was at hand, and therefore he had
regular contact with them. The ensuing relations with priests
could become quite close. Sometimes, father Augustinus
Blommert, a priest who maintained good working relations
with the bailiff, even mediated between Van Alteren and his
parishioners when these wanted to settle an offense out of
court (Knuttel, 1892–1894, 274–275; Scholtens, 1947, 177–
180, 191; Van Lommel, 1881: Wils, 1933, 161–169 ). Van
Alteren had Johan Colterman, notary and attorney, collect
the money. Relations between Colterman and the Catholic
community became so friendly that the Calvinist consistory
feared he would convert.
But there had been more infringements on the
“Weberian” value framework. Van Alteren was in the habit
of settling tax fraud out of court, which the law did not
allow for. Maerten Simonsz. and Jacob Claesz., who had
committed fraud in the 40th penny (a tax on the sale of
real estate), had settled their case out of court for 44 duca-
tons. A certain Aeltge, reputed to be madam of a brothel in
Haarlem, had mediated for them. Van Alteren had withdrawn
the complaint against these gentlemen, without notifying the
judges. When Niesge Pietersdr. from Aalsmeer had become
a widow, she hadn’t paid the 20th penny succession duty. The
bailiff had made her settle this for 16 ducatons, but had not
made her pay her taxes to the county. In 1652, Van Alteren
made Dirck Clock, secretary of the village of Aalsmeer,
pay 900 guilders in return for not being prosecuted over a
fraud with the 40th penny. The amount the bailiff demanded
was so enormous that Clock had to take a mortgage on his
house, but he paid nevertheless “to save himself, his wife
and his children from worse.” Yet, the secretary of the vil-
lage of Slooten, who had received a similar treatment, had
not given in.
Several fishermen, who Van Alteren had caught while
fishing with nets with meshes that were too narrow, had set-
tled their transgression for a small sum. Van Alteren had
then allowed them to go on with their illegal practice. Jan
Dircxsz. Kaersemaecker, Dirck Fransz, and Pieter Philipsz.,
finally, had clandestinely reclaimed land from the sea with-
out paying their dues to the county. Van Alteren had settled
this out of court, but had not made them pay to the county
and had allowed them to keep their land.
VIOLATING “WEBERIAN” AND FACE-TO-FACE
NORMS
Then there were cases in which the bailiff not only violated
the official rules, but also the informal ones that governed
“face-to-face society.” Beating people up in public was a
clear example of such rule violation. Not only did official
regulations forbid it, being treated in such a manner also
damaged the reputation of the bailiff’s victims. This went for
two boys Van Alteren had thrashed with his sheathed rapier,
because he suspected them of theft. One of the boys had been
locked up in jail at that, which was even more damaging
for his (and his family’s) name. It probably also went for a
beggar the bailiff had caned. The bailiff was in the habit of
subpoenaing people in person in very minor cases—insult,
petty domestic violence, minor acts of vandalism—as well,
which was highly damaging to reputations. That Van Alteren
himself had been caught shooting and stealing ducks, and
confiscating a sum of money that had been collected by
aldermen from Sloten, Sloterdijk, Osdorp, and De Vrije
Geer, to pay the ransom for a fellow-Kennnemerlander who
had been taken hostage on the Barbary Coast, made such
matters even more annoying.
Floris Jansz. van Nieuwerkerck was a fisherman who
had caught people hauling in his nets and had pursued the
thieves. When he caught up with them, they were waiting
for him with “roers.”3 It turned out that the supposed thieves
were the bailiff’s men. The fisher had then asked his neigh-
bors for help, but the bailiff thrashed these so hard with
his rapier that the pommel had flown from the hilt. When
3A “roer” is a hunting rifle, perhaps best translated as a caliver.
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Van Nieuwerkerck greeted the bailiff very politely, he was
thrashed as well. He was then locked up with one of his
neighbors for the night until he paid bail.
In some instances, the bailiff’s heavy-handedness led to
pure extortion. Willem Houtten de Jonge, for instance, who
had met the bailiff while riding on horseback, had been
caned by him and then arrested. The bailiff made him pay a
ransom in the form of six pounds of tobacco, which Houtten
paid, as part of his father’s land was in Kennemerland and he
could not afford to stand up to the bailiff. As compensation,
the bailiff allowed him to hunt and fish for free. When the
bailiff later found that the tobacco was not to his taste, he
put a pistol to Houtten’s chest and threatened to shoot him.
He also called him a scoundrel, which was no mean mat-
ter in 17th century Holland, and warned him that “those that
eat cherries with great persons shall have their eyes squirted
out with the stones” [“‘t’is quaet kerssen mette heeren te
eeten”’]. A friend of his, Maerten Heijndricxsz., an equerry,
had taken part in this deal as well. He received a fishing and
hunting permit in exchange for stabling the bailiff’s horses
when he visited Amsterdam. Gijs Cornelisz, from Sloterdijk,
was arrested at night. He managed to escape but the bailiff
lodged policemen in his house until Cornelisz. paid to be
relieved of the disgrace. This had cost Cornelisz. almost all
he possessed. Two farmers, who had made a transaction, but
had then decided not to sell/buy, were extorted on accusa-
tion of tax fraud. Handling stolen goods needed to be settled
as well. Dirck Taenis, who had bought a heifer that later
turned out to be stolen, needed to sell a plot of land to pay
the bailiff off.
Locking people up in jail and being arrested in public
was highly damaging to their name. Therefore, when the
bailiff did this without legal reason, he violated two sets of
norms, not just the “Weberian” one. This happened in the
case of Maerten Maertensz. (nicknamed “double Maerten”)
who was arrested in the middle of the night, together with
Jan Jacobsz., and was brought to the Haarlem jail on an open
wagon, in a civil law case. Exactly the same happened to
Mr. and Mrs. Uureijt, who had beaten their maids to stop
them from fighting, and Jan Pietersz. Jonck, who had come
to blows with an inn-keeper. Jan Jansz., a shoemaker from
Aalsmeer, had even been tortured, after two pasquils had
been found in his house (the bailiff had wanted to know who
the authors were) and Herman Claesz. had spent six years
in jail. The bailiff appears to have been quite careless with
other people’s reputations. Abraham Egbertsz. Paternoster,
a merchant from Amsterdam, had been shooting at some
birds with a small caliver. The bailiff caught up with his
wagon and started calling him names immediately. He then
accused Paternoster of stealing ducks, and threatened him
with his rapier and Paternoster’s own caliver. Finally, he
searched Paternoster’s wagon. On a different occasion, when
Van Alteren met Paternoster in an inn, he accused him of
not being married to Mrs. Paternoster, threatened him with
his rapier, called him a scoundrel and his wife a whore, and
locked Paternoster up in a room. When he met Mr. and Mrs.
Paternoster a third time, he intimidated them and urinated on
the street in front of them, “moving his manhood in a very
indecent manner.”
Bailiffs were supposed to maintain Holland’s strict moral
laws, those against adultery especially. A topos in every
pamphlet against bailiffs was, therefore, their own conjugal
ethics, as stories about bailiffs involved in indecency cases
themselves—and thereby violating two sets of norms—
never failed to stir the public’s imagination. In Van Alteren’s
case, such accusations appear to have been true. François
Martel, the bailiff’s servant, testified to his master’s vis-
its to brothels, and many other witnesses could be found.
Joris de Wijse, the bailiff’s notary, told that he had assisted
Van Alteren in his dealings with a Polish gentleman named
Van Wijmere, who was blackmailing the bailiff after he had
caught him with a married woman. When Van Wijmere was
in jail, De Wijse had bought the obligation Van Wijmere
had forced Van Alteren to sign for much less money than
it was worth. The married woman Van Wijmere had caught
Van Alteren with was called Clara de Graeu. The bailiff had
visited Clara more often. When De Wijse asked him why
he slept with a woman that “had a face that was a remedy
against love” (“een tronij hadde, die een remedie tegen de
liefde was”), the bailiff answered that she was pretty beneath
her clothes. He also told the notary that Clara had been inex-
perienced in making love initially, but that he had trained
her the way a horseman trains a horse. De Wijse himself
also slept with Clara, and Van Alteren told him jokingly that
that made them brothers-in-law and that De Wijse was now
brother-in-law to many other men of influence who would
advance his career. De Wijse caught the bailiff in bed with
another woman as well, on which occasion the bailiff had
bragged that he had made love to her three times in a row.
When Van Alteren was himself in De Wijmere’s position,
i.e., when he found out that a certain Jannetge Claesdr. was
carrying an illegitimate child, he had made both Jannetge
and her lover—a married man—pay.
Van Alteren had also managed to turn two women into
his mistresses. Heijltge Duindams had a father who served
Van Alteren as a postman, which is how she met the bailiff.
Heijltge herself worked as a seamstress in the household of
the lord of Nieuwerkerk. At the end of 1646, she had started
to sleep with the bailiff and, after two years, she became
pregnant. Van Alteren had then arranged for her to give birth
to her child in Amsterdam, in the house of midwife Jannetge
Manuels. The bailiff paid for the upkeep of his son until
1653, but then stopped sending money. In Holland, a sworn
midwife could only assist unmarried women if they had told
her who the father of the child was, which was why unmar-
ried women were often sent to a place where they did not
live to give birth (Haks, 1985, 85–86, 91). But Van Alteren’s
name was known outside of Kennemerland, and that was
why Heijltge had told the midwife the father was “Lodewijk
Sijmonsz..” Lodewijk Sijmonsz. was Van Alteren’s name,
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but not the name people knew him by, as he was usually
called “the Lord of Jaarsveld.” When men of Van Alteren’s
social status decided not to pay for the upkeep of their ille-
gitimate children, there was little women like Heijltge could
do. They would always lose if they instituted legal proceed-
ings, but they could threaten to cause a scandal (Haks, 1985,
86–94), and that is what Heijltge did. When she had spent
600 guilders on the upkeep of her son, everything she owned
had been brought to the pawnbroker’s shop. She then asked
Van Alteren’s notary, Johan Colterman, for help. The bailiff
ordered Colterman to pay Heijltge a small sum and appease
her with empty promises, which left her little choice than to
call on Van Alteren at his home.
Cornelia Innevelt was more assertive. When Van Alteren
made her pregnant in 1649, she lived in the house of Dirck
Paau, where she had worked as a wet nurse. Paau moved
her to The Hague, but the The Hague bailiff found out about
the case, so Cornelia had to be moved to Amsterdam after
her child had been born. Cornelia signed a deed stating
Van Alteren was not the father of her child, but demanded
that the bailiff would maintain her. When he wouldn’t send
money, and her landlord had confiscated her belongings as
she couldn’t pay the rent, she visited Van Alteren at his house
and created a scandal in front of his door. Yet, when she
was questioned by the provincial court, she still kept pro-
tecting Van Alteren. The bailiff had also tried to seduce a
lady’s maid of the lady of Brederode, one of his servants
later testified.
THE GREY ZONE
Value systems could also clash, of course. There were
instances where Van Alteren acted against one set of norms
in order not to violate another. This happened when Van
Alteren settled highly degrading high justice cases out of
court. As it happens, a bailiff could bring perpetrators to
court, but he could also settle offenses out of court by mak-
ing perpetrators pay a fine to him directly. To do the latter,
the permission of the judges was usually required, but in
many cases bailiffs settled without asking (Verhaar & van
den Brink, 1989). For perpetrators, settling out of court had
the huge advantage of leaving their reputation undamaged
as it was done in secrecy (Van de Pol, 1996, 179–181). Even
if they didn’t settle out of court, bailiffs and sheriffs had a
personal financial interest in prosecuting, as they received
part of the fines too. But for bailiffs, settling out of court
was more attractive than bringing cases before the judges
because they received the money faster, could be more cer-
tain of receiving it, and because there was no legal maximum
to the amount they could charge (Van de Pol, 1996, 235–236,
241–244, 247, 253).
Obviously, settling out of court involved risks as well.
Extortion was one of those, and there was also the chance
that certain crimes would go without the punishment the law
stipulated, because they had been made commutable (Van
der Burg, 1996, 16–17). Some crimes could not be settled,
and there was always the risk that bailiffs did so neverthe-
less, without asking permission. Finally, the existence of the
practice made bailiffs and sheriffs very susceptible to the
accusation of extortion, even if they were innocent (Van der
Burg, 1996, 26). Which crimes could be settled, and which
not, remains unclear, but apparently high justice crimes
could not be settled, and certainly not without permission
of the judges (Hovy, 1980, 414). Theft of large amounts of
money or very valuable goods fell in this category.
According to Hovy, who has looked into the cases Van
Alteren settled out of court before, the bailiff had settled two
thefts with the judges’ permission. The rest had been settled
clandestinely (Hovy, 1980, 427–428). Maertge Jansdr., for
example, had stolen cloth and gold- and silverware to a total
value of about 500 guilders, but had managed to settle this
with the bailiff for 30 guilders after a man from Heemstede
had mediated for her. Frederick Claesz. had stolen a boat
and had managed to settle his theft as well. He had paid the
enormous sum of 2,900 guilders and 100 pounds of sugar at
15 stivers per pound. For this amount of money, the bailiff
could be persuaded to make the judges declare Claesz’s’ case
fit to be settled out of court.
Formal permission to settle was also obtained in the case
of Dirck Egbertsz. from the village of Heemskerk. From
Claesz.’ Case, it becomes clear how Van Alteren went about
making deals, and how he managed to make people pay
such large sums of money. He waited for the accused to
come to him and then kept silent while they started offer-
ing money. By remaining silent, he managed to make his
victims raise the sum themselves. Often, he found it difficult
not to burst out laughing whilst doing so and had to leave
the room. On such occasions, he told his wife that he had his
victims bargaining already and that the rest would be easy
(“ick hebbe aen t’ looven, het sal nu wel gaen”). When Aries
Jansz. vanden Rhijn stole some sheep, the priest Augustinus
Blommert, who had to do business with the bailiff on a reg-
ular basis anyhow, acted as mediator. He also lent Aries’
father money to pay the bailiff off. Aries’ father then needed
to sell six cows, a horse, some sheep, and a few tools to
redeem his loan. What this last example again shows is that
the bailiff’s victims had taken the initiative themselves and
had actively sought the help of people who knew Van Alteren
in order to be able to approach him. In a face-to-face soci-
ety, being brought to court was much worse than having to
pay a large sum of money, and the price wasn’t always high.
The son of Cornelis Jacobsz. Steijns got away with paying
70 guilders and an amount of biscuit. In the case of the
daughters of Gerrit Cornelisz., it wasn’t money the bailiff
was after. They got away after their father offered to act as
informer for Van Alteren.
Manslaughter was a crime that could certainly not be
settled out of court, not even if the judges had been
informed. What a bailiff could do, if he felt the offender
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couldn’t be blamed for what had happened, was institute a
legal procedure called “landwinning,” but that could only
be done through county government. According to Hovy,
Van Alteren nevertheless settled manslaughter out of court,
and of course without informing the judges (Hovy, 1980,
425–426). The records prove him right. Trijn Dircxdr. Taeij,
for instance, who had killed a neighbor by hitting her with
a pot, had gotten away. Her brother had paid the bailiff 100
dollars. The victim had died a few days after she had been
attacked and the bailiff had then had the necropsy done in
the presence of one of the judges. Yet, he had refused to
have the victim’s skull opened. Thus he could claim that it
had not been Trijn’s assault that had killed the victim.
Something similar happened in the case of Cornelis
Jansz. Vlamingh, who had stabbed Willem Jansz. Mos in
the arm. As Mos hadn’t died instantly, it could be claimed
that the wound hadn’t caused his death. In the case of Claes
Dirxsz., who had fled after he had committed manslaughter,
the bailiff couldn’t even be persuaded to start an investi-
gation. What he did do, though, was seize the offender’s
inheritance when his mother died, to make his family settle.
Claes Cornelisz. settled a manslaughter out of court but, in
his case, it proved necessary to also disappear to the East and
West Indies. Miller Pieter Jansz. stabbed his sister’s son, who
was also his employee, to death but could not be prosecuted
by the sheriff of the village of Wormer, as he had settled with
the bailiff. Van Alteren’s lieutenant had sold the killer’s fur-
niture to settle the bill. Finally, there was a certain Cees or
Claes Kuijt from Oostzaan—some witnesses also identified
him as “Pieter metter Cuijten” (“Peter with the calves”) —
who had allegedly settled a manslaughter with the bailiff and
fled, but who’s identity could not be ascertained.
If Van Alteren took the initiative, which sometimes hap-
pened, he needed to put pressure on his victims, which was
illegal (Hovy, 1980, 414). One of the methods he employed
was “private incarceration”: the use of an (illegal) private
prison at his home. This happened to quite a number of
the people we’ve met before: Nicolaus Stenius, for instance;
Dirck Egbertsz., and Aries vander Rhijn. It had also hap-
pened to Johannes and Abraham Molijn, 18 and 12 years of
age, respectively, who had gone fishing, had caught noth-
ing, and had then stolen some small eels from a fyke net.
The bailiff had locked them up for eight days, and had not
allowed their mother to visit them. He had been after the 600
guilders the boys had inherited. When Mrs. Molijn refused
to pay, Johannes was brought to court. The bailiff demanded
that he be flogged publicly and then be banished, but the
judges set him free. Van Alteren did manage to have Mrs.
Molijn pay six dollars, though, in exchange for not appealing
against the judges’ favorable verdict.
Gerrit Claesz., a ten-year-old, had also been locked up
for a few days on the accusation of having smuggled wine,
but he had managed to escape through an attic window.
Bruijno Bruijnsz., who had been locked up because the
bailiff thought he was a priest, had escaped through a
window, as well, by tying his sheets together. Sometimes,
Van Alteren seems to have had no other option: in 1644, he
had had a quarrel with a certain Blaeuw from Amsterdam.
One day, Blaeuw was lying in wait for Van Alteren at his
door, with his knife drawn. The bailiff had then managed to
pull Blaeuw inside his house and lock him up. Later, he set-
tled this case out of court. Doing the opposite, setting his
detainees free without the knowledge of the judges, which
Van Alteren did in some of the cases mentioned above, was
also illegal.
To get away with all these irregularities, Van Alteren
needed to take liberties with procedural law (Hovy, 1980,
428). He was often late with nominating the candidates for
the positions of judges, didn’t convene the court for months
on end, held court with an insufficient number of judges,
substituted absent judges with unqualified substitutes (even
if qualified ones were at hand), had his private manservant
take down testimonies in the presence of one judge only or
none at all (instead of the two judges that were required) and
then committed forgery to cover this up, used his private ser-
vant as a process server, intimidated his victims, and took the
initiative to settle out of court. In one instance, when some-
one had wanted to appeal, he had even demanded money
to convene the court. To cover up such financial irregular-
ities, he had stopped keeping accounts a year after he had
been appointed. The Estates had intervened in 1648, draw-
ing up new regulations for the court of Kennemerland, but
this intervention had obviously not sufficed (Lams, 1664,
129–136).
VAN ALTEREN’S DEFENSE
Van Alteren used several strategies to defend himself when
the provincial court confronted him with all the evidence.
One of these was to slander the witnesses. He asserted they
were all “falsifiers, thieves, forsworn adulterers and formal
enemies” of his. He also claimed there were witnesses on his
behalf as well, namely the notaries De Wijse and Colterman,
and his former lieutenant, De Jong. François Martel, the
policeman who had stopped the fishermen with a caliver,
actually did testify on the bailiff’s behalf, claiming that the
fishermen had been fishing out of season and had come at
him with nine men when he tried to do something about
it, which is why the bailiff had had them arrested. Pointing
out how honorable and influential his family was served as a
defense too, as people without a good reputation were unfit
to testify. In slandering the witnesses against him and point-
ing to the reputation of his family, the bailiff obviously made
use of the fact that the two value systems he worked with
could support each other.
Van Alteren denied nearly everything brought against him
in the hope of gaining access to the “ordinary legal pro-
cedure,” as we have seen before. He admitted to having
seized the inheritance of Claes Dirxsz. but, when lawyers
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had explained to him that this was illegal, he had repaid the
confiscated money, although he had received a small sum
for his expenses. He denied having settled the manslaugh-
ter committed by Trijn Taeij. What sometimes happened, he
admitted, was that people gave him a small sum prior to
payment of the legal costs, which he used to pay the sec-
retary and the process server, but these were not settlements.
He had never heard about the manslaughters committed
by Pieter mette Cuijte, Claes Cornelisz. or Pieter Jansz.,
which is why he hadn’t prosecuted these gentlemen. When
he finally heard about Pieter Jansz., he had been too busy
preparing his own trial to act against him. Nor had he ever
settled larceny out of court, he claimed. He kept deny-
ing having settled the theft Aries Jansz. had committed,
even when he was confronted with the witness, Augustijn
Blommert, who had mediated between the bailiff and the
thief’s father.
Van Alteren asserted that he had never settled tax fraud
cases either, nor had he made deals with Roman Catholics.
What he did do was disrupt Catholic services, as was his
duty, and then fine the Catholics. It may have been that
father Blommert had testified to the fact that Van Alteren had
warned the priests beforehand when two of the provincial
court’s judges were to inspect and close Catholic churches in
Kennemerland, that he had been paid for his help, and that he
always demanded money when new priests were appointed.
But the bailiff claimed that these sums were voluntary gifts,
not bribes, and denied having warned the priests. Colterman
had testified to the fact that the bailiff had made all the
villages pay regularly for their Catholic churches, and had
explained that the codes in Van Alteren’s books stood for
these villages’ quarterly payments.
When the provincial court asked why the fines Catholics
paid were always of the same amount, and why they were
paid every quarter, the bailiff kept denying that they were
quarterly installments. If churches had been opened again,
after the provincial court had had them closed, then that had
been done without his knowledge during the period he was
preparing his own trial (Van Lommel, 1881).
Unsurprisingly, Van Alteren also denied the accusations
of adultery. He had never slept with Heijltge Duijndams, he
claimed, and he had only sent notary Colterman to her to
ask her to keep away from his house, because he didn’t want
someone of such ill repute to be seen near his home. Nor
had he ever made love to Cornelia Innevelt, or been to broth-
els. He kept denying, even when confronted with Heijltge
herself. She had visited him at his home over a matter of
money that was due to her brother for land surveying and
over a quarrel she had had with the wife of the sheriff of
Heemstede, the bailiff claimed. The so-called brothels he
had been in were respectable inns, and he had been there in
his capacity as bailiff. He hadn’t slept with Clara de Graeu
either. It was true that he had visited her once, when he had
been with friends in Amersfoort and had been a bit tipsy, and
that he had then been set up by Van Wijmere. He had agreed
to pay him as he had wanted to preserve his reputation. It was
also true that he had then ordered De Wijse to collect the
obligation Van Wijmere had made him sign on that occa-
sion, as he would have become the object of mockery if he
had done so himself.
CONCLUSION
What, then, were the limits to administrative behavior in
Holland in the 1650s, and how did Van Alteren deal with
the two value frameworks he needed to work with? As Van
Alteren died during his trial, there never was a verdict and
his story has no proper ending. Whether there was any truth
in the complaints against the bailiff, we don’t know. But,
as this is an investigation into the prevailing administrative
norms and values of the time, we don’t really need to. These
values, after all, can be deduced from accusations as well as
from a verdict, as accusing someone of something that the
court would have accepted makes no sense.
What we can say, on the basis of the accusations, and
Van Alteren’s defense, is that the bailiff appears to have
been accused of playing with his two normative frame-
works, picking the set that suited his momentary purposes
best. He was said to have used the fact that the application
of the official “Weberian” rules was highly disgraceful to
exploit offenders by trying to make them settle out of court,
something the rules allowed for under some circumstances.
Because of the degrading effect of being sentenced in court,
offenders were often willing to go along and, indeed, took
the initiative themselves.
What the official rules allowed for was none too clear,
but settling high justice crimes out of court appears to
have been crossing a line, certainly when done without the
judges’ permission. Yet, the fact that offenses could be pun-
ished with fines but also settled out of court enabled Van
Alteren to mask one type of payment as another, his accusers
claimed. A similar game could be played with legal costs and
dues, and with the occasional presents the early modern gift
culture asked for.
Making deals with Catholics was also against official
rules, but here it seems to have been timing that proved to
be fatal. Van Alteren’s predecessor in office had done exactly
the same. Van Alteren was caught because he was accused of
not prosecuting Catholics during the only decade in the his-
tory of the Dutch Republic in which strictly applying these
rules was politically advisable.
Van Alteren wasn’t always successful in having the
best of both worlds when he played with the value sys-
tems, according to his accusers. Sometimes, official rules
(for example against police harassment) protected citizens
against disgrace. If Van Alteren broke these rules, for
instance by dragging people to jail in broad daylight in
very minor cases, he violated two value systems. The same
went for locking people up in a private prison in his home,
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [V
rije
 U
niv
ers
ite
it A
ms
ter
da
m]
 at
 05
:17
 11
 M
arc
h 2
01
2 
EXTORTION AND ABUSE OF POWER IN THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 739
or using disproportionate violence. Yet, when people did
not take the initiative to settle, and even stood up against
him, Van Alteren seems to have had no other option if he
wanted to settle. According to his accusers, he was forced
into ever more rule-breaking. Eventually, if we believe the
complaints against the bailiff, it was even necessary to tam-
per with procedural law. He could come in conflict with
two value systems at the same time, as well, when he him-
self violated the laws against adultery. Interestingly, he put
preservation of his own reputation forward when defend-
ing himself against such accusations. The face-to-face value
framework alone could be played with too.
Van Alteren was hardly ever accused of violating the
face-to-face value system only, it appears. An exception
might have been the indecent behavior towards Abraham
Egbertsz. Paternoster and his wife. The picture may have
been distorted by the fact that the description of his case is
mainly based on the provincial court’s files, but it appears
that the bailiff behaved exactly as one of Prices’ Ghanaian
administrators, according to his accusers: he always let face-
to face norms prevail over “Weberian” ones. “Extremism”
was a strategy early modern Dutch administrators could fol-
low for a while, therefore, but probably, eventually, not with
impunity.
Yet, there is an alternative explanation for Van Alteren’s
downfall: he wasn’t extremist enough. As it happens, not
only does the bailiff’s story lack a proper ending, it doesn’t
have a proper start, either. We don’t know what started the
investigations against him. Was it burgomaster Lams (who
wrote a thick volume on Kennemerland’s privileges to pro-
tect his village from intrusions by bailiffs like Van Alteren
in the future) who filed the first complaint? Did the two vil-
lage secretaries Van Alteren prosecuted for tax fraud start
the trial? We don’t know, but it seems very likely. And, in
that case, it was applying “Weberian” rules, when sticking
to face-to-face practices to appease the village elite would
have been most advisable, that did for Van Alteren. If that
was what prompted Van Alteren’s trial, then the differences
between Riggs’ endoprismatic and exoprismatic government
might not have been that large after all.
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